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CONSOLATION AND CARTESIAN IMMORTALITY
Marc Elliott Bobro

Like many other Christian philosophers, past and present, Descartes envisions an "afterlife" for the soul after bodily death. Some, both Christian and
non-Christian, including Geach, Strawson and Williams, have argued that
the afterlife Descartes envisions is far from the attractive state heaven is supposed to be. Others, including Leibniz, Russier, and Cottingham, have
argued that a Cartesian afterlife represents a state of existence that cannot
even be rationally desired. But I shall argue in this paper that both criticisms
fail to appreciate fully the details of Descartes' doctrine of immortality.

As for the soul's condition after this life ... by natural reason alone we can
make many gratifying guesses and have fine expectations, but we cannot
have any certainty. (Rene Descartes: AT IV, 333 [1645])
Many conceptions of immortality-indigenous, folk, and Christianpromise not only the endless, future existence of a conscious person in relation to other conscious persons and contingent upon gods or God, but also
the possibility that this existence be blissful. Now, although Descartes does
on occasion attempt to prove the natural immortality of the soul, he is
notoriously shy about discussing the nature of immortality. Nevertheless,
this fact has not stopped philosophers, Christian apologists, and even science fiction authors, from criticizing the sort of disembodied survival
Descartes envisions for the soul after bodily death. Some have argued that
such survival is far from blissful; actually, it is a "bleak fantasy.'" Others
have argued that Cartesian immortality represents a state of existence that
cannot be rationally desired. 3 But I shall argue that both criticisms reveal a
lack of understanding of Descartes' doctrine of immortality. All told, this
doctrine does not deserve the volume of vilification it generally receives.
Though it probably deserves some.
1. Death and Dualism
"It is a savage superstition," Peter Geach says, "to suppose that a [human]
consists of two pieces, body and soul, which come apart at death; the
superstition is not mended but rather aggravated by conceptual confusion,
if the soul-piece is supposed to be immaterial. The genius of Plato and
Descartes has given this superstition an undeservedly long lease of life; it
gained some accidental support from Scriptural language '" about flesh
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and spirit-accidental, because a Platonic-Cartesian reading of such passages is mistaken, as Scripture scholars now generally agree.'" Be that last
point as it may, in this section I want to explain quickly what this "superstition" amounts to in Descartes' hands.
For Descartes and the Scholastics, immortality entails the endless, future
existence of a conscious person in relation to and contingent upon God.
But, for Descartes, what are the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the continued existence of a person? A person is just a particular
thinking substance, a res cogitans (AT VII, 78: CSM II, 54). So, to continue to
exist as one and the same person, one must remain one and the same particular res cogitans. What, however, are the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the continued existence of a res cogitans? It is easier to
answer this question via a process of elimination. The first thing to realize
is that a res cogitans, a thinking substance, is utterly distinct from a res extensa, an extended substance. Descartes rejects hylomorphism-the view
according to which individual substances are corporeal unities, constituted
of matter and form-even while he retains the language of hylomorphism.
According to traditional hylomorphism, death is the disintegration of a single, unified substance, for forms are themselves neither substances nor are
they capable of existing apart from matter. 5 But, contrary to traditional
hylomorphism, Descartes holds that our body (the res extensa we are temporarily united with) and soul (i.e., the res cogitans we are identical with)
are two distinct substances, each of which could exist separately from the
other. The essence of the body is extension; the essence of the soul is
thought and volition, which cannot be extended. Cartesian death, therefore, entails the survival of the immaterial soul (the res cogitans) after decay
of the material body (the res extensa).
Furthermore, Descartes eliminates all of the accidental properties or
"accidents" of res cogitans as being identity conditions of res cogitans: " ...
the human mind," he writes in the Synopsis of the Meditations (1640), "is
not constituted of any accidents, but is a pure substance: for even if all of its
accidents change, so that it has different objects of the understanding and
different desires and sensations, it does not on that account become a different mind; whereas a human body loses its identity merely as a result of
a change in the shape of some of its parts" (AT VII, 14: CSM II, 9).
Descartes also eliminates from the identity conditions of res cogitans the
passive faculty of sensory perception and its active counterpart, imagination. He writes in Meditation 6: "I find in myself faculties for certain modes
of thinking, namely imagination and sensory perception. Now I can clearly
and distinctly understand myself as a whole without these faculties" (AT
VII, 78: CSM 11,54). In sum, it is neither necessary or sufficient for the continued existence of a res cogitans, and hence a person, to possess the same
thoughts, beliefs, desires, sensations, mental images, or even the mental
capacities of sensation and imagining. It follows that I could wholly preserve my identity even if, God forbid, all my current thoughts, beliefs,
desires, and my other "accidents" were erased and replaced with new
ones. So, what identity conditions are necessary and sufficient? Descartes
appears to stress only two mental capacities in us: the faculty of thought or
understanding (i.e., the intellect) and the faculty of volition (i.e., the will).
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So, as long as I keep my intellect and will (just what this means is not at all
clear), I am the same res cogitans, and hence the same person.
Such an account of what it means to be a res cogitans over time facilitates
quite nicely a proof for our immortality, argues Descartes: since a res cogitans does not lose its identity on account of any change (however radical) of
its accidents-as opposed to a res extensa-we cannot die, except by God's
hand (AT VII, 14: CSM II, 9; AT VII, 153: CSM II, 109). Lest I be misunderstood, I am not asserting here that this proof for the immortality of the soul
is "nice."6 Instead, my point is merely that given Descartes' dualist metaphysics, a "proof" for the soul's immortality can easily be fashioned.
II. Blissful Existence or Bleak Fantasy?

How attractive could a life, or better, an "afterlife," be for a disembodied
res cogitans? Or to state the question another way, could the promise of
such an afterlife serve to console us regarding our future survival beyond
death? Geach agrees with Descartes that we can demonstrate "the possibility of disembodied thought; thought unconnected with any living organism. And some continuing disembodied thought might have such connection with the thoughts I have as a living man as to constitute my survival
as a 'separated soul'."7 However, such a prospect is far from attractive,
Geach argues:
To be sure, such survival must sound a meagre and unsatisfying
thing; particularly if it is the case, as I should hold, that there is no
question of sensations and warm human feelings and mental images
existing apart from a living organism. But I do not want the prospect
to be anything but bleak; I am of the mind of Aquinas about the survival of 'separated souls', when he says in his commentary on I
Corinthians that my soul is not I, and if only my soul is saved then I
am not saved nor is any man. Even if Christians believe there are
'separate souls', the Christian hope is the glorious resurrection of the
body, not the survival of a 'separated soul'.8
The Bible tells us of a sincere, wealthy young Jewish ruler who came up to
Jesus and asked, "What shall I do that I may inherit etemallife?" (Mark
10:17). But, if Descartes were right, according to Geach, this young ruler
would not want to inherit eternal life. Embodiment seems necessary
(though of course not sufficient) for an attractive existence.
But must needs Descartes deny embodied immortality? In other words,
might not Descartes stay true to his dualist theory of soul and body and his
denial of the resurrection of the body we are united with in our time on
earth and at the same time offer a vision of the afterlife that is truly attractive, and to that extent console us? It appears so, if Descartes were to accept
a view wherein souls take on new, "subtle" or celestial bodies in the afterlife. Arguably, this is the orthodox Judaeo-Christian view, as articulated by
thinkers as historically stratified as Paul, Origen, and Leibniz. 9 This is what
Paul writes to the Corinthians:

192

Faith and Philosophy

There is a physical body, and there is a spiritual body .... Just as we
have borne the image of the one made of dust, we shall also bear the
image of the heavenly one. I tell you this, brothers: flesh and blood
cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit
the imperishable. Lo! I tell you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but
we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at
the last trumpet. For the trumpet will sound, and the dead will be
raised imperishable, and we shall be changed. For this perishable
nature must put on the imperishable, and this mortal nature must
put on immortality. (I Corinthians 15:44-53)
Here, Paul expresses the proposition that there are different kinds of bodies.
The resurrection-body will be a new one; it will be an incorruptible one, neither a body of flesh and blood nor a body of a purely phantasmal naturethat would be a form of extreme docetism.1O Though historically there have
been exceptions within the Christian community-Tertullian and St.
Augustine both accepted a straightforwardly physical view of the resurrection body-we are told by an authority that lithe pendulum has been swinging strongly in the direction of a more spiritual ... view."l! In fact, Christians
by and large are motivated to hold a subtle or celestial body account of the
resurrection in part for precisely the kinds of reasons Geach gives.
But there are two good reasons to think that Descartes would be unimpressed by such an attempt to reconcile his dualism with an embodied
afterlife via union with a "celestial," incorruptible body. First, according to
Descartes, there are no naturally incorruptible bodies; being extended,
bodies by their very nature undergo an ever-changing movement of parts,
and are therefore subject to dissolution. And, Descartes is adamant that
there cannot be two kinds of body--one corruptible and one not. As he
attempts to demonstrate in the Principles of Philosophy, since we can understand body in only one sense (that is, simply in its being an extended substance), therefore celestial matter can be no different from terrestrial matterY So "even if there were an infinite number of worlds, the matter of
which they were composed would have to be identical" (AT VIllA, 52:
CSM I, 232). Even if God were to render a body incorruptible, it seems that
this would not change the body's essence, but rather involve the restructuring of the laws of motion and perhaps the universe's initial states. In other
words, bodies are of one kind~xtended substance; thus, they are naturally corruptible even if God were to allow some individual body or all individual bodies to persist forever. 13 (Descartes' account of celestial and terrestrial matter alike as being generable and corruptible certainly owes
much to Galileo's devastating criticism of Aristotle. H )
Second, Descartes believes that even without the body, happiness, joy,
pleasure, satisfaction, and contentment are possible. So, even if we could
reconcile Descartes' dualism with the possibility of an embodied afterlife,
there might be no special reason to do so. To understand this second point,
we must be aware of a couple of very important distinctions that Descartes
makes. First, there is the distinction between strictly intellectual acts-"I
have often distinctly showed that the mind can operate independently of
the brain" (AT VII, 358-9: CSM II, 248}-and mental acts involving refer-
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ence to physical states (AT X, 415-6: CSM I, 42f). So, Descartes denies the
claim that the mind develops or deteriorates with the body, and conversely
(AT VII, 353f: CSM II, 245). Second, there is the distinction between the
kind of knowledge the soul gains "by the reflection which it makes on itself
in the case of intellectual matters" and "in the case of corporeal matters"
the kind of knowledge the soul derives from reflection "on the various dispositions of the brain to which it is joined, which may result from the
action of the senses or from other causes" (AT II, 598: CSM III, 140). So, for
example, a person thinking about God, or doing metaphysics, or reflecting
on the soul itself-assuming, at least, that he or she has the true, non-physical notions of God, the soul, and so forth-is acting purely intellectually.
So, even in a disembodied state, according to Descartes, intellectual acts
and the knowledge gained therefrom are possible.
But knowledge is not the only thing to be gained in a disembodied state.
There can be joy as well. In the Passions of the Soul (1649), Descartes writes
that "the purely intellectual joy that arises in the soul through an action of
the soul alone .... may be said to be a pleasant emotion which the soul
arouses in itself whenever it enjoys a good [a good thing is that which reason judges to be agreeable to our nature (AT XI, 391: CSM 1,358)] which its
understanding represents to it as its own" (AT XI, 397: CSM I, 360). So, for
example, when someone mediates on the resemblance between the human
soul's nature and God's nature and comes to understand properly that our
mind is "an emanation of his supreme intelligence .... they are filled with
extreme joy" (AT IV, 609: CSMK III, 309). "Of course," as Descartes points
out, "while the soul is joined to the body, this intellectual joy can scarcely
fail to be accompanied by the joy which is a passion [namely, the 'corporeal' joy (AT XI, 396: CSM 1,360)]. For as soon as our intellect perceives that
we possess some good, even one so different from anything belonging to
the body as to be wholly unimaginable, the imagination cannot fail immediately to form some impression in the brain, from which there ensues the
movement of the spirits which produces the passion of joy" (AT XI, 397:
CSM I, 361). (As an interesting aside, when Descartes speaks of our imperfections in Meditation 4, he does not mention our passions at all. Instead,
he focuses on the limitations of our intellect.!6)
So emotions can attend both this life and the next, according to
Descartes. But it seems that we can also have desires in the afterlife. And,
in fact, we may have some of the same kinds of desires, whether we are
united with a body or not. For example, in both states, we may have a
desire for knowledge-Descartes calls this 'curiosity' (AT XI, 394: CSM I,
359}-and a desire for the preservation of the good and for the absence of
an evil (AT XI, 375: CSM I, 350). Descartes also speaks of these desires
being frustrated in the afterlife, leading to less-than-joyful emotions (AT XI,
434: CSM I, 378). There may be intellectual sadness as well; such a state
affects the soul when the understanding represents an evil or deficiency as
its own (AT XI, 397: CSM 1,361). Hence, the life of the disembodied soul as
Descartes envisions it is not so different as we might first imagine from the
life of the embodied soul.
For Descartes, therefore, we can have emotions and desires in a disembodied state. But what about sensations, feelings, and mental images?
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Surely, Descartes' dualism entails that there would naturally be no new
sensations, feelings, and mental images in a separated soul, for such "accidents" are mental acts that must involve reference to physical states. '7
There would thus be no bodily pleasures in the afterlife. But Descartes
does not find this consequence at all unattractive. For there is an important
difference between the pleasures of the body and those of the soul, as he
explained to Princess Elizabeth after he heard that she was seriously ill:
The body is subject to perpetual change, and indeed its preservation
and well-being depend on change; so all the pleasures proper to it
last a very short time, since they arise from the acquisition of something useful to the body at the moment of reception, and cease as
soon as it stops being useful. The pleasures of the soul, on the other
hand, can be as immortal as the soul itself provided they are so solidly founded that neither the knowledge of truth nor any false conviction can destroy them. (AT N, 286: CSM III, 264f)
Interestingly, this view of Descartes' echoes Hobbes, who writes in
Leviathan: "[T]here is no such thing as perpetual tranquility of mind, while
we live here; because life itself is but motion, and can never be without
desire, nor without fear, no more than without sense" (Part I, vi, 58; my
emphasis). But the idea here-and it is much clearer in Descartes than in
Hobbes-is that the mind, at least on the intellectual level, can find permanent pleasure or "perpetual tranquility," to use Hobbes' phrase.
Descartes also emphasizes to Princess Elizabeth that the soul "subsists
apart from the body, and is much nobler than the body, and that it is capable of enjoying countless satisfactions not to be found in this life. This prevents us from fearing death, and so detaches our affections from the things
of this world that we look upon whatever is in the power of fortune with
nothing but scorn" (AT N, 292: CSM III, 265f). In fact, Descartes believes
that "if we had no body ... we could not go too far in abandoning ourselves to love and joy, or in avoiding hatred and sadness" (AT XI, 434:
CSM I, 378). Louis de la Forge, a Cartesian, thinks he understands what
Descartes is driving at: "[The soul] will conceive things by the action of the
understanding alone, which will furnish it with much clearer and more
distinct ideas than all those it had by means of the senses in this life, even
if, in comparing those with each other, there may have been some which
were more evident or obscure than others. That is why the soul will be
incomparably happier in this state than it is at present."'S
I think de la Forge is probably right about Descartes. Indeed, Descartes
claims, "our well-being depends principally on internal emotions which
are produced in the soul only by the soul itself. [I take it that 'internal emotions' refer to intellectual emotions. Descartes speaks of the "purely intellectual joy that arises in the soul through an action of the soul alone" (AT
XI, 396: CSM I, 360).] .... Although these emotions of the soul are often
joined with the passions which are similar to them, they frequently occur
with others, and they may even originate in those to which they are
opposed" (AT XI, 440f: CSM 1,381). Descartes then gives a couple of very
interesting examples:
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[Wjhen a husband mourns his dead wife, it sometimes happens that
he would be sorry to see her brought to life again. It may be that his
heart is tom by the sadness aroused in him by the funeral display
and by the absence of a person to whose company he was accustomed. And it may be that some remnants of love or of pity occur in
his imagination and draw genuine tears from his eyes. Nevertheless
he feels at the same time a secret joy in his innermost soul, and the
emotion of this joy has such power that the concomitant sadness and
tears can do nothing to diminish its force. Again, when we read of
strange adventures in a book or see them acted out on the stage, this
sometimes arouses sadness in us, sometimes, joy, or love, or hatred,
and generally any of the passions, depending on the diversity of the
objects which are presented to our imagination. But we also have
pleasure in feeling them aroused in us, and this pleasure is an intellectual joy which may as readily originate in sadness as in any of the
other passions. (AT XI, 441: CSM I, 381)!9
Descartes goes on to suggest that "these internal emotions [such as the private intellectual joys experienced by the mourning husband and the bookreader, respectively j affect us more intimately, and consequently have
much more power over us than the passions which occur with them but are
distinct from them" (AT XI, 441£: CSM 1,381£). "To this extent," Descartes
continues, "it is certain that, provided our soul always has the means of
happiness within itself, all the troubles coming from elsewhere are powerless to harm it. Such troubles will serve rather to increase its joy; for on seeing that it cannot be harmed by them, it becomes aware of its perfections.
And in order that our soul should have the means of happiness, it needs
only to pursue virtue diligently" (AT XI 442, CSM I, 382). But for Descartes,
of course, a diligent pursuit of virtue is much more possible and realistic in
a state unencumbered by the body and its concomitant passions. The soul
will be, as the Cartesian de la Forge insists, "master of its thoughts."20
This being said-and there is much more to be said-Descartes' account
of the life (or better, afterlife) of the disembodied soul is not as unattractive
is it might first appear. Moreover, I think that the aforementioned letters to
Elizabeth reveal some effort on Descartes' part to console her that the
soul's condition after separation from the body is actually an attractive and
valuable prospect. But is Descartes' attempt to console Princess Elizabeth
at all convincing? I doubt that Bernard Williams would think so. He writes:
"[Life after death] might consist of purely intellectual activity, which of
course many philosophers have seen as the ideal future. I can see why they
might be particularly interested in it; others might be less so ... I mean,
suppose that the prospects of Heaven or the future life are those of intellectual contemplation, and I am a jolly, good-hearted fun-loving sensual character from the seaside."2! How would Descartes respond to this criticism?
Perhaps Descartes would reply that the fact that I am more of a sensual
person than an intellectual one-that I prefer a sensual existence over an
intellectual one-is a merely accidental property of mine. (It is interesting
to note that Descartes himself was much more of a sensual character than
is commonly thought. 22 ) Such a property might even be contingent on hav-
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ing a body. But the afterlife is a disembodied one, according to Descartes,23
so it then follows that the question of whether we would prefer a sensual
existence as opposed to an intellectual one, at least when applied to the
afterlife, is moot. 24
Reminiscent of Williams, Strawson argues that Descartes' vision of the
afterlife is singularly unattractive since, he claims, it entails a solitary and
therefore lonely existence. Let me quote a lengthy passage from Strawson:
[T]he strictly disembodied individual is strictly solitary, and it must
remain for him an utterly empty, though not meaningless, speculation, as to whether there are any other members of his class. The
other, and less commonly noticed point, is that in order to retain his
idea of himself as an individual, he must always think of himself as
disembodied, as a former person. That is to say, he must contrive still
to have the idea of himself as a member of a class or type of entities
with whom, however, he is now debarred from entering into any of
those transactions the past fact of which was the condition of his having any idea of himself at all. Since then he has, as it were, no personallife of his own to lead, he must live much in the memories of the
personal life he did lead; or he might, when this living in the past
loses its appeal, achieve some kind of attenuated vicarious personal
existence by taking a certain kind of interest in the human affairs of
which he is a mute and invisible witness-much like that kind of
spectator at a play what says to himself: 'That's what I should have
done (or said), or 'If I were he, I should ... ' .... At the limit of attenuation there is, from the point of view of his survival as an individual, no difference between the continuance of experience and its cessation. No
doubt it is for this reason that the orthodox have wisely insisted on
the resurrection of the body.25
However, to my mind, Descartes can mount a reply to Strawson similar to
the one we supposed in the case of Williams. The basic idea is simply this:
the sort of existence Descartes envisions is so radically different from life as
we know it that we must be very careful not to judge its attractiveness
from, or in relation to, our current, comfortably embodied state of being.
But it seems that Strawson does precisely that. As we already saw,
Williams seems to make this mistake as well. At any rate, this is largely
speculative; as far as I can determine, Descartes never entertains the sort of
objection Williams and Strawson raise.

III. Rational Desire
We might wonder if all this talk of the attractiveness or value of Descartes'
doctrine of immortality is even relevant. Blissful. Bleak. We can debate the
attractiveness of Descartes' vision of the afterlife all day, but it has been
argued that the kind of immortality Descartes envisions is a future we can
have no reason to desire, no matter how attractive it may seem and even
how blissful it might be for an individual to experience it. We cannot look
forward to, or anticipate a future life in which we will permanently lose the
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memory of our past-in this case, embodied-life. Or so the objection goes.
The possible permanent loss in the hereafter of the memory of one's past
was a serious concern for the Scholastics,26 yet perhaps Leibniz expresses
the worry best:
Descartes' immortality of soul is worth [little]. I believe that I will not
bring pleasure to some, for people are normally unhappy to be awakened from a pleasant dream. But what should I do? Descartes wishes
us to uproot false thoughts before introducing true ones. We must
follow his example; and I believe I would be doing the public a service if I could disabuse people of such [a] dangerous [doctrine]. I
therefore assert that the immortality of soul, as established by
Descartes, is useless and could not console us in any way. For let us
suppose that soul is a substance and that no substance perishes;
given that, the soul would not perish and, in fact, nothing would perish in nature. But just as matter, the soul will change in its way, and
just as the matter that composes a man has at other times composed
other plants and animals, similarly, this soul might be immortal in
fact, but it might pass through a thousand changes without remembering what it once was. 27 ••• What good would it do you to become
the King of China under that condition that you forget what you once
were? Would that not be the same as if God created a King of China
at the same time as he destroyed you? (GP IV, 300: AG 243)
In short, the mere fact that the res cogitans that I am identical with is naturally indestructible is insufficient basis for what Leibniz calls meaningful
immortality. Without mentioning Descartes as a target, Leibniz also gives
the same argument in the Discourse on Metaphysics §34:
Let us suppose that some individual were suddenly to become King
of China, but on condition of forgetting what he has been, as if he had
just been born anew. Is not this practically the same, or the same as
far as the effects which can be apperceived, as if he were to be annihilated and a King of China were to be created in his place at the same
moment? And this particular individual has no reason to desire this.
(GP iv, 460: AG 66)
Leibniz seems to argue in these two passages that it is not rational for us to
desire survival as the King of China if such a state does not guarantee the
memory or knowledge of what we have been, whatever else may be
promised. Leibniz imagines a situation where we become, in an instant, the
King of China, presumably with all the excellent accoutrements that come
with being a 17th century Chinese king. Yet, on becoming the King of China,
we forget our past, and most importantly, we forget what we once were. As
the King of China, it is as if we had been annihilated, for not only can we not
remember what we once were via introspection, but there are no other persons in our new community who could remind us of our past life and what
we once were. (Remember that Leibniz's audience consisted of 17th century
Western Europeans, some of them, like Leibniz, fascinated with Eastern cul-
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ture but with little chance of actually visiting the Far East.) If offered such a
future existence, we would have no reason to desire becoming the King of
China. And, if we cannot rationally desire a potentially very valuable state
without a guarantee of the memory of what we had been, then how can we
rationally desire any state without such a guarantee?2R
This is an interesting objection but appears at first glance to be potentially much more damaging to Averroes' or Spinoza's doctrines of immortality than it is to Descartes'. For Leibniz seems to ignore completely
Descartes' important, but often overlooked, distinction between corporeal
and intellectual memory. While the memory of physical things-corporeal
memory [memoire corporelle]-"depends on the marks [vestiges] which
remain in the brain, after an image has been imprinted on it" (AT IV, 114:
CSM III, 233), as the folds in a piece of paper make it easier to fold again in
that way than it would be if it had never been so folded before or, to use an
analogy borrowed from Plato's Theaetetus, as a wax block retains imprints
after being impressed upon, the memory of intellectual thingS-intellectual
memory [memoire intellectuelle]-"depends on some other marks which
remain in the soul itself" (AT IV, 114: CSM III, 233). But besides the kinds
of objects it takes, intellectual memory differs in another way from corporeal memory. "Intellectual memory has its own separate impressions,
which do not depend in any way on these folds" (AT III, 84: CSM III, 148).
Rather, it is contained wholly within the immaterial soul and can function
entirely without the body.29 Thus, it seems there is nothing in Descartes'
doctrine of immortality that rules out the preservation of intellectual memory in the disembodied soul.
On the other hand, Averroistic and Spinozistic doctrines of immortality
deny that memories of any kind-corporeal or intellectual-are preserved
in the afterlife. (Of course, the term 'afterlife' does not quite register in the
systems of these two philosophers.) Leibniz certainly criticizes Averroes
and Spinoza along the same lines he adopts against Descartes' doctrine of
immortality (A vi, 6, 58f; GP vi, 143ff, 529-38; L 554ff, 594). Regarding
Spinoza's view in particular, Leibniz writes very early on in his career
"that what will survive ... will in no way pertain to us, for it will not be
remembered, nor shall we have any sensation of it, and we labor in vain to
perfect our mind on behalf of its state after death. For that ultimate perfect
essence [there is some sarcasm here, I think], which is all that will survive
when we die, is nothing to us" (A vi, 3, 510: P 63). Perhaps then Leibniz
mistakenly lumps Descartes in with Spinoza and Averroes.
Yet, as Jeanne Russier, Emilienne N aert, and John Cottingham have wondered, even if Descartes' distinction between corporeal and intellectual
memory makes perfect sense and we do retain our intellectual memories
after bodily death, how is it that intellectual memories alone can preserve
one's sense of one's personal past?30 For intellectual memory seems to concern only universals (e.g., redness, organic according to the Appellation
d'Origine Contralee, king, friend, birthday) and not particulars (e.g., organic
red wines, King Louis XN, the images, sounds, and faces of my friends, my
14th birthday), as Frans Burman claims Descartes told him (AT V, 150: CSM
III, 337). Also, Descartes himself writes that "where intellectual things are
concerned, memory in the strict sense is not involved; they are thought of
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just as readily irrespective of whether it is the first or second time that they
come to mind" (AT III, 425: CSM III, 190). It would thus appear that
Descartes does not hold that logical, geometrical, and metaphysical truths,
for example, are properly even remembered. Now there is certainly a role for
intellectual memory (for example, in pure deduction where there is no
recourse to empirical data) and it is a useful faculty, but at the same time it
is difficult to see how intellectual memories can preserve the sense of one's
personal past. So the fact that Leibniz does not seem to recognize Descartes'
distinction between corporeal and intellectual memories is moot, since (or
so the objection goes) corporeal memories are necessary for the preservation
of the memory of one's personal past. Leibniz's objection thus retains some
force against Descartes. Cottingham neatly describes the problem: "When
sensible ideas and images fade, the soul will be left to contemplate merely
abstract and general ideas such as those of mathematics. And this in turn
makes it hard to see how any real personality or individuality could be preserved. Just as the Thomists had earlier wrestled with the problem of what
differentiates one angel from another, so the later Cartesians were in trouble
explaining how one impersonal, disembodied res cogitans could be distinct
from another. In the end, the ghost of Averroes, which had plagued the
scholastics, returned to haunt the Cartesians."31
But there is reason to think that Russier, Naert, and Cottingham have got
Descartes wrong. To begin with, it is doubtful whether Burman expressed
Descartes' views entirely accurately. For probably Descartes did not mean
to say that the content of intellectual memory concerns only universals (and
I have seen nothing in what he says that entails this); rather, it is in the very
act of pure intellection that only universals are used. For example, in deducing that the rational numbers are non-denumerable I grasp only universals.
Yet at the same time it seems that Descartes does not want to rule out the
possibility that I remember having proved in the past that the rational numbers are non-denumerable; and, it seems that this intellectual memory is of a
particular, a particular past deed of mine. To reiterate, apart from the somewhat dubious Conversation with Burman, which has some problems with
provenance, Descartes' account is perfectly compatible with the idea that
even when I store a memory dealing with the grasping of a universal
axiom, such as "The rational numbers are infinite," that memory also deals
with a particular, namely, "I recollect proving that the rational numbers are
non-denumerable in the past." In fact, as Richard Joyce argues and as we
will see shortly, "Descartes needs to locate the faculty for remembering such
things in the soul; he has, after all, no model for how such a purely mental
activity could leave a trace upon the corporeal brain. So in this respect the
intellectual memory contains particulars (concerning 'intellectual things') as
well as universals."32 So although it is plainly dear that Descartes has no
completely worked out account of intellectual memory (though he hints as
though he does in a letter to "Hyperaspistes" [AT III, 425: CSM III, 190£]), it
is possible that Descartes himself thinks that intellectual memory alone can
guarantee the memory of one's personal past.
But debating whether or not Descartes himself believes intellectual
memory alone can guarantee the memory of one's personal past is neither
here nor there unless we can see how it is that intellectual memory can pro-
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vide such a guarantee. At first glance, it appears that it cannot. For does not
one's personal past include inter alia morally evaluable actions, that is,
those actions for which one is morally responsible? Perhaps even such
actions comprise the most important subset of one's actions. But purely
intellectual deeds, for example, proving that the rational numbers are nondenumerable in graduate school, are not normally morally evaluable.
Expect in rather bizarre circumstances, 1 do not deserve moral praise for
proving that the rational numbers are non-denumerable; neither do 1
deserve moral blame for making a mistake in the proof. Generally, our
morally evaluable deeds are restricted to our bodily actions, as when 1 help
someone with a proof.
However, there are clues in Descartes' corpus to the effect that intellectual memory alone does have the capacity to retain memories of bodily
actions. In other words, it is possible that Descartes himself believes that
the memories of bodily actions are or at least can be preserved in intellectual memory. Suppose that 1 want to recall my first tuba lesson. Now, for
Descartes, while 1 am still united with "my body" (a res extensa) "my soul"
(strictly speaking, the res cogitans that I am identical with) can willfully
"revisit" (the French souvenir) memories of bodily actions by initiating and
completing a search of my corporeal memory. Corporeal memory, we
might recall, depends on the physical marks which remain in the brain
after an image has been imprinted on it." So to revisit the memory of my
first tuba lesson as it is inscribed on my brain, my soul must somehow be
able to recognize a previously imprinted image, from millions of other previously imprinted tuba-related and non-tub a-related images, as the memory of my first tuba lesson. But how can the soul accomplish this, without
already knowing in some sense what it is searching for?34 There seem to be
only two plausible explanations that Descartes can give. First, he might
claim that images themselves are stored not only in the brain, but also in
the soul. But this would seem to make his account of corporeal and intellectual memory superfluous and redundant. For why would the soul need
to make a search of the brain? Second, he might say that corporeal memories are indexed in the soul's intellectual memory in an attenuated or compressed form. So the memory of my first tuba lesson is actually inscribed
on my brain as a particular image or set of images as well as stored as a (I
would guess) linguistic or propositional entity in my soul that is somehow
sufficient, without being the same kind of thing, to function as a purely
mental counterpart to a physical entity in the brain. But in either case, it
seems that intellectual memory alone can serve as a repository of bodily
and therefore, morally-evaluable actions. 35 (I wonder if this explains, at
least in part, why Descartes claims in a letter to Mersenne that intellectual
memory, not corporeal memory, is what "we mainly use" [AT III, 143:
CSMK III, 151]. For on my interpretation of Descartes' account of memory,
every corporeal remembering is also an intellectual one but not every intellectual remembering is a corporeal one.) Admittedly, this talk about the
function of intellectual memory is somewhat speculative-Descartes gives
us little to go on-but it seems that Descartes' notion of intellectual memory is broad enough (and vague enough) to facilitate the preservation of the
memory of bodily actions and not just purely intellectual ones. If so, then it
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seems that the afterlife Descartes envisions is a state of existence we can
have reason to desire.
Yet I should not suppress the fact that there are several philosophical
problems with such an account. For instance, if intellec1.ual memories are
merely linguistic or propositional in form, what is it that guarantees that
my intellectual memories of bodily actions are actually of the actions of my
body, as opposed to someone else's body?36 For it seems that merely linguistic or propositional encodings in one's memory could not themselves
represent or uniquely pick out the particular self that underwent the
actions described in those linguistic or propositional encodings. If there
were no such guarantee, then how is it possible that I can preserve my personal past after losing my body and therefore my brain? Presumably,
Descartes would say that it is God who guarantees that the memories of
bodily actions that I retain after bodily death are indeed memories of my
body's actions, by setting up some reliable causal process from which
memory traces on the brain are somehow registered on the soul. But does
not this appeal to God and causation miss the point? The question was
whether a linguistic or propositional entity alone could serve to represent
or pick out one self among many. But what does the causal origin of that
entity have to do with its content? To be fair, though, I do not think that
Descartes is alone in facing such problems in representing in memory alone
the history of one and the same self. Consider the famous case of Locke
and his theory of personal identity. Also, I do not want to presume that
Descartes (or Locke for that matter) has no answer to such problems. We
might also question whether intellectual memories must be linguistic or
propositional in form, but I do not any good alternatives, either.

IV. Doting on the Beyond
Thus far, we have seen that Descartes says enough, perhaps just enough, to
accommodate the possibility of an afterlife that we can rationally desire
and that is potentially quite attractive. Nevertheless, Descartes' treatment
of immortality lacks the confidence and specificity which might be expected by those seeking consolation in the idea of immortality. This "problem"
was evident even to Descartes' disciples. De la Forge, for example, tries to
remedy the situation by giving a much more definite and confident
description of the state of the soul after bodily death.37 But why is
Descartes' own treatment lacking? A couple of causes can readily be surmised: (i) due to the unorthodox, possibly heretical nature of his doctrine
of immortality, Descartes does not want to reveal too much about his position; and, (ii) he simply has not worked out his doctrine of immortality in
any adequate way.3S No doubt both (i) and (ii) help to explain why
Descartes says little about the condition of the immortal soul after bodily
death. However, I do not believe that (i) and (ii), even taken jointly, are sufficient to explain why Descartes (except perhaps in his letters to Elizabeth)
seems not at all concerned to console us about the afterlife. To my mind,
what is missing from any complete explanation is the interesting fact that
(iii) Descartes does not think that the question of what the afterlife will be
like is an appropriate one to pursue in a deliberate or systematic way.
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There seem to be two main reasons why Descartes thinks that we
should not dote on the beyond, as it were. The first is epistemological in
kind: we lack any certain knowledge of the nature of immortality.
Consider the following exchange between Princess Elizabeth and
Descartes. Elizabeth writes to Descartes on October the 28th, 1645:
If one is well persuaded of the immortality of the soul, it would be

impossible to doubt that the soul will not be happier after its separation from the body (which is the origin of all the displeasures of life,
just as the soul is the origin of the greatest contentments [of lifeD
were it not for the opinion of Mister [Kenhelm] Digby 39 •.. [who
believes] that the passions that have dominated over reason during
the life of man still leave some traces in the soul after the death of the
body; and all the more they torment the soul the more they find no
means of satisfying themselves in so pure a substance. I fail to see
how this accords with the soul's immateriality. But I have no doubt
that, although life is not evil in itself, it ought to be abandoned for a
condition that one will know to be better. (AT IV, 323f)
Descartes responds on November the 3rd:
As for the state of the soul after this life, I am not so well informed as
Mister Digby. Leaving aside what faith tells us, I agree that by natural reason alone we can make many gratifying guesses and have fine
expectations, but we cannot have any certainty. The same natural reason teaches us also that we always have more good than evil in this
life, and that we should never leave what is certain for what is uncertain. Consequently, in my opinion, it teaches that though we should
not seriously fear death, we should equally never seek it. (AT IV, 333:
CSMK III, 277)
Suppose one were to reply to Descartes that we could be certain about
the state of the soul after bodily death if we were only to enquire as to what
kind of immortality God would promise us. But Descartes is plainly clear
that we are not, as the Scholastics wantonly did, to assert claims about this
world and the next based merely on our understanding of what God would
or would not do. That would be to know God's intentions, his reasons for
making this world and the next the way they are. But, as Descartes is purported to have said in his conversation with Burman: All the purposes of
God are hidden from us, and it is rash to want to plunge into them. I am not
speaking here of purposes which are known through revelation; it is purely
as a philosopher that I am considering them. It is here that we go completely astray. We think of God as a sort of superman, who thinks up such-andsuch a scheme, and tries to realize it by such-and-such a means. This is
clearly quite unworthy of God ... " (AT V, 158: CSM III, 341). Descartes also
says: "I do not take it upon myself to try to use the power of human reason
to settle any of these matters which depend on the free will of God" (AT
VII, 153: CSM II, 109). So, it seems at best disingenuous to accuse Descartes
of fashioning a doctrine of immortality in which there is no guarantee that
II
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the memory of one's personal past will be preserved in toto in the afterlife.
For Descartes, what kind of immortality God has in store for us is something we do not know, nor should we care to speculate.
There is a second reason why we should not dote on the beyond.
Consider what Descartes writes to Elizabeth in a slightly earlier letter on
October the 6th, 1645:
It is true ... that knowledge of the immortality of the soul and of the

felicity of which it will be capable after this life, might give occasion
to those who are tired of this life to leave it, if they were certain that
they would afterwards enjoy all that felicity. But no reason guarantees this, and there is nothing to show that the present life is bad
except the false philosophy of Hegesias (whose book was banned by
Ptolemy because many of its readers killed themselves). True philosophy, on the contrary, teaches that even amid the saddest disasters
and most bitter pains we can always be content, provided that we
know how to use our reason. (AT IV, 315: CSMK III, 272)
The main idea here, I think, is that wise and good humans will not concern
themselves with the precise make-up of life after death even while they
face adversity or even death. For not only is our knowledge of the afterlife
uncertain, life on earth is really not so intolerable. And, even during those
"intolerable" times, our rational nature allows us to remain content. Note
the distinctly Stoic element, here. In fact, in another exchange with
Elizabeth, Descartes praises and discusses the Stoic ethic and recommends
that she read Seneca's treatise De vita beata (AT IV, 253: CSMK III, 256).40 I
do not think it too much of a stretch to educe that for Descartes the wise
and good person will trust in God's goodness-which surely extends also
to the present life-and not seek consolation in speculation about the next
life. (Descartes' reference to Seneca is highly ironic, considering the fact
that Seneca was a great and famous consoler.'! I would argue that for
Seneca the central aim of philosophy is precisely that of consolation.)
I am reminded here of what the "metaphysical poet" George Herbert
says in 1633: "Poor man, thou searchest round [t]o find out death, but misseth life at hand."42 Kant too seems to have much the same attitude. Not
only does Kant agree with Descartes that we know very little about our
future life, but also by trying to describe it, "the speculative man becomes
entangled in mysticism where his reason does not understand itself and
what it wants, and rather prefers to dote on the beyond than to confine
itself within the bounds of the world, as is fitting for an intellectual inhabitant of a sensible world."43

V. Conclusion
So, Descartes thinks that demonstrating that there is hope of an afterlife is
enough. And, he thinks he has done this with his argument for the real distinction between soul and body. Descartes writes in the Synopsis of the
Meditations: " ... the decay of the body does not imply the destruction of the
mind, and hence enough to give mortals the hope of an afterlife" (AT VII,
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13: CSM II, 10). At the same time, Descartes does not think that he needs to
demonstrate that there is hope for an afterlife, as he writes to Mersenne: "I
could ... prove ... only that [the soul] is by nature entirely distinct from the
body, and consequently is not bound by nature to die with it. This is all
that is required as a foundation for religion, and is all that I had set out to
prove" (AT lIt 266: CSM IR 163). This is not very consolin~ but it seems
that consolation was not a high priority for Descartes. 44
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